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Notes and Comments
Tenant Unions: Collective Bargaining and the Low-
Income Tenant
More than 15 million people throughout the country live in sub-
standard or deteriorating rental housing units.' Many municipal hous-
ing codes or state tenement-house laws declare such housing conditions
unlawful.2 But if the landlord chooses to ignore complaints, the tenant
usually has no quick, effective remedy to compel even emergency
repairs.3 He can protest to the building department or initiate a costly,
drawn-out court proceeding.4 Or the tenant can move-provided, of
course, he can find another flat to rent.
In several Chicago apartment buildings, however, tenants now have
an alternative: grievance machinery under a collective bargaining
agreement between landlord and tenant union.5 Recently, for example,
a Chicago slum tenant discovered that several floorboards on his back
porch had rotted through.6 The tenant reported the condition to the
union grievance committee. Upon investigation the committee decided
that the whole porch was about ready to go, and at its weekly meeting
with the landlord asked him to replace the entire structure. The land-
lord denied that the porch was dangerous but suggested that he would
1. This figure somewhat understates the situation. There are 5.3- million deteriorating
or dilapidated occupied rental housing units in the United States. G. BEYER, HOvSING
AND SOCIETY 144 (1965). The average household in the United States has 3.8 people.
BUREAU OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TIlE UNITED
STATES 35 (1966). These figures yield an estimate of approximately 18 million people living
in substandard rental housing units. Most substandard housing is rented. Cf. B. DUNCAN
& P. HAUSER, HOUSING A METROPOLIS-CHICAGO 84 (1960).
2. See Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 CoLuAI.
L. REv. 1254, 1254-55 (1966).
3. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
& OFFICE OF EcONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, TENANTS' RIGHTS 5-6 (1967) (hereinafter cited as
TENANTS' RIGHTS]; ILLINOIs LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON Low INCOME HOUSING, FOR BMnrR
HOUSING IN ILLINOIS 21-22 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ILLINIOS COMMISSION]; MASSACIIUSLTrS
SPECIAL COMMISSION ON Low-INcoM'E HOUsING, FINAL REPORT 64 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
MASSACHUSETrs COMMISSION].
4. See pp. 1372-73 infra.
5. "Tenant union," as it is used in this Note, refers only to a tenant organization which
seeks a collective agreement with the landlord defining the obligations of both the tenants
and the landlord. See TENANTS' RIGHTS 16-17.
6. The example in the text is an amalgam of several incidents. Interviews with Charles




fix it the following year. The committee was unimpressed; it demanded
that the issue go to the arbitration board created by the collective
bargaining agreement. The three-member board, composed of landlord
and union representatives and a third person selected jointly by land-
lord and union, found the porch unsafe; but upon verifying the
landlord's limited financial resources, it directed him to replace only
floorboards actually rotting away. Had the landlord still refused to
repair, the tenant-union members could have withheld their rent and
paid their money instead into an escrow account, until either the land-
lord made the required repairs or the union could finance the work
itself through the accumulating funds.
The alluring tenant union model has spurred the negotiation of
collective bargaining agreements between tenants and landlords not
only in Chicago but also in other cities across the country.7 As yet no
mass movement has developed because of the large effort required to
organize a union and hold it together. But as early associations have
gained experience, the sophistication of their contracts and of their
negotiations with landlords has increased. In some cases landlord as
well as tenant has come to appreciate the advantages of a stable tenant
organization.8 Even the federal government has recognized the institu-
tion.9 Although few unions have been in existence long enough to
justify any firm conclusions about their ultimate usefulness, their initial
successes and failures suggest that they can play a significant role in
some housing situations where other techniques are unavailing.
7. E.g., Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 18, 1967, at 16, col. 1; Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 17,
1967, at 12, col. 1; Wall Street Journal, Nov. 16, 1966, at 1, col. 1; Tr-a,'rs Ricirrs 16-17;
Glotta, The Radical Lawyer and the Dynamics of a Rent Strihe, 26 GuLaD PctArmo.En
132 (1967).
8. Letter from Joan Cole, Housing Coordinator, United Planning Organization in
Washington, D.C., to the Yale Law Journal, Nov. 28, 1967; interview iwith John Condor,
first major Chicago landlord to sign a collective bargaining agreement, in Chicago, May
3, 1967. But see Strauss, Tenant Unions: Special Privilege Outside the Law, 32 J. Prop.
MANAGEMENT 129 (1967).
Public housing authorities have also begun to appreciate the value of tenant organiza-
tions. See NATIONAL AssoCIATION OF HousiNG AND REDEVELOPMEN%-r OFFIcIAts, Puic
Housui is Tm TzNAsrrs (Critical Issues, 111) 27 (1967); letter from Van Story Branch,
assistant director for housing management, Baltimore Urban Renewal and Housing
Agency, to the Yale Law Journal, Nov. 20, 1967; Hearings on Proposed Housing Legisla-
tion for 1967 Before the Subcomr. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 642-43 (1967).
9. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation in its capacity as lessor of 84
foredosed properties in Illinois signed a three-year contract with a newly organized tenant
union. Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 18, 1967, at 16, col. I; the Department of Housing and
Urban Development also approved a lease for a Muskegon, Midi., public housing project
which recognizes a tenant union and establishes formal grieiance machinery. Letter from
Ronald Glotta, attorney for the East Park Manor Tenants' Organization, to the Yale Law
Journal, Feb. 24, 1968.
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I. The Origins of Tenant Unionism
Tenant organizations are not exclusively the product of present
conditions. As long ago as the 1890's, severe economic depressions and
housing shortages triggered the formation of tenant groups.10 In New
York City, for example, the acute post-World War I housing shortage
and the depression of the 1930's both produced large scale tenant
organizations." Such groups, arising in response to extraordinary con-
ditions, sought and received temporary legislative palliatives such as
moratoria on evictions as well as rent reductions.12 Predictably, the
organizations were short-lived; once the pinch had eased, they melted
away. More recently, the grievances animating tenant organizations
have shifted to the chronic ills of city slums: deteriorated housing, high
rents, and absentee landlords. The most recent and well-publicized
wave of tenant protests swept New York in 1964, when the massive
rent strikes led by Jesse Gray gained wide publicity.1" Even there,
however, the tenant groups demanded only one-shot repairs from the
landlord. Some tenants won, but even they must start the whole struggle
afresh as soon as another defect appears.14
The goals and tactics of tenant unions differ sharply from those of
earlier groups. Their emphasis is on a stable organization dealing
directly with the landlord on a continuing basis. Like a labor union,
the tenant union begins by joining individual tenants into a cohesive
association, and then negotiates an agreement with the landlord defining
the obligations of both parties and providing specific procedures for
the resolution of disputes. Although the similarities between tenant
and labor unions are evident enough, tenant unions neither derive
exclusively from the labor model nor represent so sharp a break with
past landlord-tenant law as might appear at first glance. Tenant unions
reflect the convergence of two developments: a trend in recent landlord-
tenant statutes toward increased tenant participation in efforts to fin-
prove housing conditions, and the civil rights movement with its off-
spring, the war on poverty.
10. Piven 8- Cloward, Rent Strike, THE Nav REPUBUC, Dec. 2, 1967, at 11.
11. W. Rudell, Concerted Rent-Withholding on the New York City Housing Front:
Who Gets What, Why, and How?, May, 1965, at 20-28, 39-45, 61-63 (unpublished divisional
paper in Yale Law School Library); see L. PosT, THE CHALLENGE OF HouSING 157-58 (1938),
12. See W. RuDLL, supra note 11, at 28-31.
13. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1963, at 1, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1963, at 37, col. 3; N.Y.
Times, Sept. 28, 1963, at 1, col. 5.
14. The inadequacies of the rent strike which does not produce an organization capable
of overseeing long-term reforms spurred two critics to call for more revolutionary measures.
They urged tenants to refuse to pay any rent (to the landlord or into escrow) and thus
to bring the system to its knees. Piven 8. Cloward, Rent Strike, Nzw REPUBLIC, Dec 2,
1967, at 11, 13.
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A. Remedial Statutes
The common law of landlord-tenant relations has long been inca-
pable of dealing satisfactorily with the problems of private housing in
an urban industrial society. Traditional notions of property rights have
sharply restricted the tort liability of apartment house owners for even
dangerously dilapidated structures so long as the tenants were in pos-
session of the premises.Y1 In order to collect his rent the landlord had
no obligation even to maintain the apartment in a habitable condi-
tion."6 By a relentless adherence to the doctrine that covenants in a
lease are independent, the courts preserved the landlord's right to
collect the rent even when he breached a written promise to repair.1
The courts conceded only the principle of constructive eviction to the
tenant, but that relief was scant comfort except in the most outrageous
circumstances.' 8 The common law, in short, gave the landlord the right
to keep his property in whatever condition he desired. Its sole solution
for tenant complaints was the right to terminate the lease and quit
the premises.
Legislatures, however, have not regarded property rights with such
awe. Slums are ancient phenomena, and statutes have long recognized
that the public interest in adequate, safe, and sanitary housing condi-
tions may override private property claims. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries state legislatures responded to the inadequa-
cies of the common law by enacting tenement-house statutes in an
effort to set minimum housing standards.' Over the next 50 years the
early regulations evolved into the elaborate housing codes of today.O
But administrative enforcement of housing codes did not eliminate sub-
standard housing; where the landlord's operation was profitable, fines
for housing-code violations effectively amounted only to a tax on his
15. Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624, 169 A. 912 (1933); PLsrATE5--r (SEcOND) OF
Toms §§ 355-56 (1965); 2 F. HARPE & F. Ja2Ers, ToRs § 27.16, at 1506 (1956); 1 H.
T-ANY, REAL PaoPEarY § 99 (3d ed. 1939).
16. Widmar v. Healy, 247 N.Y. 94, 159 N.. 874 (1928). Nor is there any duty on the
landlord to keep leased premises in good repair, Withy v. Mfatthevs, 52 N.Y. 512 (1878);
1 H. TmEANY, REAL PRoPrTY § 103 (3d ed. 1939).
17. Johnson v. Haynes, 330 S.V.2d 109 (Ky. 1959); Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 455,
15 N.E.2d 476, 479 (1938); see Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 446 (1953). In some jurisdictions, a land-
lord may be liable for injuries which would have been avoided if he had honored his
agreement to repair. 2 F. HArar & F. JA,.ss, TOmRs § 27.16 at 1514 (1956); 1 H. TOTAn',
REAL PaaPERTY § 106 (3d ed. 1939).
18. Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826); 1 AM.UCAN Lw or Pnorrr " § 3.51
(A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
19. For a brief history of housing legislation, see Grad & Gribetz, supra note 2.
20. See, e.g., Nmv HAvEN, CONN. ORDINANCEs it, V (1962).
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business. 21 Consequently, some states established receiverships, -" per-
mitted welfare departments to withhold rents,2 1 or authorized public
agencies to make emergency repairs with bills over to the landlord for
costs. 24 The courts have consistently upheld such measures as valid
exercises of the state police power.
25
Until recently, most statutes could be enforced only at the initiative
of an official arm of the government, either judicial or administrative.
Now, however, tenant-initiated remedies are receiving increased atten-
tion because they are thought more effective. 26 Also implicit in tenant-
initiated remedies is a growing awareness that the tenant has a special
interest in adequate housing in preserving the public health and wel-
fare generally.27
The earliest tenant-initiated remedies were the "repair and deduct"
statutes which allowed individual tenants to withhold rent under care-
fully circumscribed conditions to repair significant defects in their
apartments.2 Although such statutes did relieve the tenant somewhat
from his total reliance on government action to protect his interests,
the threat and effect of individual rent withholding were minimal.2 9
21. Grad & Gribetz, supra note 2, at 1272, 1275-78; Note, Enforcement of Municipal
Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801, 820-26, 830-31 (1965); Metropolitan Housing and
Planning Council of Chicago, Summary of Report on the Major Violators of Housing
Code, June 5, 1963.
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 19-347b (Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 127H-J (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:42-79 to 2A:42-82 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAw § 309 (McKinney Supp.
1967). Receivership laws have not been very effective. Note, Receiverships in the Rehabili.
tation of Urban Housing, 2 HARV. Civ. RxiHTs-Civ. LiB. L. REy. 219, 230-31 (1967); Note,
Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 828-30 (1965). In the first
two years following enactment of New York's receivership law, less than 100 buildings
were placed in receivership or were brought up to code requirements under threat of a
receivership. Gribetz, New York City's Receivership Law, 21 J. HousING 297 (1964).
23. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, Public Aid Code, § 11-23 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); N.Y.
Soc. WEL . LAW § 143(b) (McKinney Supp. 1966); Rent Withholding, Rent Strihes, Tenant
Unions, Mandatory Statewide Housing Standards, 24 J. HousING 256, 257-60 (1967). See
also Simmons, Passion and Prudence: Rent Withholding Under New York's Spiegel Law,
15 BUFFALO L. Rav. 572 (1966).
24. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARD. L, REV. 801, 834.86
(1965); N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1967, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1, col. 1.
25. E.g., In re Department of Bldgs. of the City of New York, 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200
N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964) (receivership); Farrel v. Drew, 19 N.Y.2d 486, 227
N.E.2d 824, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967) (welfare rent withholding); 300 W. 154th St. Realty Co.
v. Department of Bldgs., 55 Misc. 2d 37, 284 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1967) (emergency repairs).
26. TENANTS' RIGHrs 1, 7; ILLINOIS COMMISSION 23-25; Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as
a Tort, 65 MICH. L. Rv. 869, 871-75 (1967).
27. Sax & Hiestand, supra note 26, at 871-75.
28. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941-42 (West 1954); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 42-201, -202
(1947); ND. CENT. CODE §§ 47-16-12, -13 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 31, 32 (1954);
S.D. CODE §§ 38.0409, -.0410 (1939). Both the California and Montana statutes restrict the
deductible cost of the repair to one month's rent. Courts have limited the statutes in other
ways. E.g., Van Every v. Ogg, 59 Cal. 563 (1881); Wall Estate Co. v. Standard Box Co., 20
Cal. App. 311, 128 P. 1020 (1912).
29. ILLINOIS COrAMSSION 23; Note, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Sub.
standard Housing, 53 CALw. L. REv. 304, 305 n.4 (1965).
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In the past three years Massachusetts and New York have passed pro-
visions authorizing the tenant to rely on the legal process as sword
rather than shield; he may initiate a lawsuit against the landlord to
compel correction of dangerous housing conditions."0 The New York
statute is the first explicitly to legalize collective tenant action and
establish its ground rules. Article 7A of the New York Real Property
Actions and Proceedings Law3' allows one-third of the tenants in a
slum dwelling to petition for an order directing the landlord to repair
conditions "dangerous to life, health, or safety" without a prior inspec-
tion by the building department; if necessary, the court may place the
building in receivership.32 Article 7A allows organized tenants an effec-
tive initiative to seek and obtain receiverships; the state, however, still
insists on injecting itself into every landlord-tenant dispute by requir-
ing a cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive court proceeding.
B. Civil Rights and the War on Poverty
The emergence of tenant-initiated statutory remedies gave some
impetus to the formation of tenant unions; another catalyst was the
sudden popularity of community organization in the civil rights move-
ment and the war on poverty.33 The herculean task of organizing apa-
thetic slum residents has required organizers to focus on an issue that
can catch and hold the interest of the poor. Housing is an obvious
choice. Many of the original organizers of tenant unions hoped that
the organizations would expand into broadly based community and
political groups.34 While those hopes have yet to materialize, the effort
to mobilize the poor for better housing has created, at least in some
cases, a spirit of self-sufficiency and self-help. 35
30. N.Y. RzL PRop. AcnoNs LAw §§ 769-82 (MfcKinney Supp. 1967); MAss. GEM. LAWS
ANN. ch. 111, §§ 127C-H (1967).
31. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTnoNs LAw, §§ 769-82 (McKinney Supp. 1967). See Note, Tenant
Rent Strikes, COLum. J.L. & SOCAL PROB., April 17, 1967, at 2.
32. N.Y. REAL Poop. ACrONs LAw § 778 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
33. See Program of the Chicago Freedom Movement, July, 1966, at 4 (on file at the
Yale Law Journal); Note, Participation of the Poor, 75 YALE J. 559, 625.29 (1966); IV.
BmDLE & L. BEDLE, TEE colmMNrrY DEvELOP.rENTr PROCESS Lx (1965); M.I KING, IWVIE
Do WVE Go FRom HERE: CHAOS OR COTMMUNrrY? 157-61 (1967).
34. Interview with Gilbert Cornfield, tenant union attorney, in Chicago, May 2, 1957;
see NEivsiE, Jan. 31, 1966, at 24. Community organizing in the slums has not been suc-
cessful, at least in Chicago, when it focused on politics. Cf. Cotton, William Dawson Calls
the Tune, THE REPORTER, Aug. 11, 1966, at 21.
35. Interview with Charles Love, tenant union organizer, in Chicago, May 2, 1967. In
Negro slums, a "black power" argument urging black tenants to help themselves and not
wait for the "white power structure" to improve their homes has often convinced tenants
to participate in tenant unions. Id. See generally M. Cu1wAno, SLUMS AD Cosiuury DE-
vEoP~MENT 125-28, 299-308 (1966).
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IL The Economics of Slum Housing
The success of the tenant union will ultimately depend upon
judicial tolerance of its activities, and upon its bargaining power with
the landlord.36 But its potential for achievement must be gauged by
the economics of slum housing. Improvement in the condition of slum
housing requires either capital investment for rehabilitation or in-
creased expenditures for maintenance and repairs. Without govern-
ment assistance or higher rents, such funds can come from only three
sources: economies that lower other operating costs, tenant labor, and
the landlord's profits.
A. Poor Tenants, Old Housing
Most proposals for improving slum housing focus single-mindedly on
the landlord,3 7 but funds for maintenance may also be released by
lowering operating costs. For while the landlord will resist vigorously
if his profits are threatened, he should have no objection if better
housing can be provided for his tenants without changing total ex-
penditures. Because of the nature of slum housing, there is reason to
hope that this can be done.
In the American city, housing for the poor is old housing.08 As a
building ages, the pattern of income and expenses that it generates
changes significantly. Operating expenses for heat, repairs, and janito-
rial services rise and rents fall.39 As the building moves toward its
fortieth or fiftieth birthday, operating expenses often climb from 40
per cent of income to almost 60 per cent40 In addition, keeping the
building in adequate condition requires at least occasional capital
improvements. In this respect a building is like a car: the older it be-
comes and the more intensely it is used, the more expensive it is to
maintain.
Moreover, the slum tenant's rent covers more than "normal" operat-
ing expenses. The lessee who plunks down $35 for the week's rent pays
36. See sections III and IV infra.
37. Most reforms are designed to wring money from the landlord. Schoshinskl, Reme.
dies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519, 520-21 (1966); Grlbctz
& Grad, supra note 2, at 1281; see Sax & Hiestand, supra note 26, at 874-75.
38. Authorities cited note 61 infra.
39. INSIT'UTE OF REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT, 1967 APARTUENr BJILDIMN INCoIat r_-XpENSU
ANALYsTs 4, 11 (1967); Arnheim, Evaluating Expense Statistics in Property Management,
31 J. PROP. MANAGEMNT 66, 70-73 (1966). In middle-class buildings the profit squeeze pro.
duced by rising expenses and falling rents is offset by two factors, the percentage of col-
lections rises and the vacancy rate falls. Id. 73.
40. INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT, supra note 39, at 4, The selling price of a
building usually does not fall to allow for increased maintenance costs. W. GtuGsii,
HousiNG MAREMEs AND PuBric Pouc 234, 238 (1963).
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for the right-and the right of his neighbors-to vandalize the apart-
ment, to have large numbers of children jumping on the furniture, to
live in illegally small apartments, to skip out without paying the pre-
ceding month's rent, to move frequently, and to pay in weekly install-
ments. Vandalism, children's wear and tear, harassment by housing
code agencies, rent skips, high turnover, frequent collections-all are
costs that the landlord must cover by charging higher rent for less
housing.4 . Since poor people by definition cannot afford to pay high
cash rents, the landlord increases his price by offering fewer square feet
of space and fewer services.-
The tenants themselves, acting in concert through a tenant union,
can help reduce the operating costs of housing. Tenants driven by
personal frustration or anger at the landlord to vandalize or dump
garbage in the hallway can be counseled and cajoled most effectively
by other tenants.43 Organization itself can be a major solvent; many
tenants do not bother to keep their building clean because they feel
other tenants will tear it up anyway. The existence of grievance
machinery may break the vicious circle in which the tenant vandalizes
his apartment in retaliation against the landlord's refusal to make
repairs, and the landlord makes no repairs because the tenant vandal-
izes his apartment. In short, the union may be able to provide the
supervision and incentive that presently characterize owner-occupied
slum tenements-usually the best maintained buildings in the slum.4
The tenant union may also be in a position to reduce the high rate
of turnover and rent skips. One study has suggested that lack of suffi-
cient space and complaints about present housing conditions motivate
families to move.48 Tenant union organizers believe that exasperation
41. See G. STEErmB, THE TNFmaNr lANDLORD 73-75 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Srmv-
UEB]. A New Haven, Conn. landlord estimated that he could reduce rents by 20 per cent
if vandalism and turnover were substantially reduced. Speech by Herbert Cohen to Yale
Law School seminar, Nov. 17, 1967. Public housing for low-income tenants also faces these
qdded costs. NATIONAL AssoCIATION OF HoUSING AND REDE ELOPM-r Omcmus, supra note
8, at 27.
42. A. ScHoRR, SLuMs AND SoC.Al. INSECURn 99-100 (1963).
43. See Rent Withholding, Rent Strikes, Tenant Unions, Mandatory Statewide Stan-
dards, 24 J. HousING 256, 261 (1967); interview with Tony Henry, tenant union organizer,
in Chicago, May 3, 1967. Cf. Sax & Hiestand, supra note 26, at 873, 905.06.
44. Interview with Tony Henry, tenant union organizer, in Chicago, May 3, 1957;
interview with five New Haven landlords in New Haven, Jan. 20, 1968. Tenants may have
their own version of the prisoner's dilemma. See generally Davis & Whinston, The Eco-
nomics of Urban Renewal, in URBAN RExEwAL: THE r.cORD AND TIM CNrnoiimsy 50,
54-57 (J. Wilson ed. 1966). The tenant union allows tenants to coordinate (and enforce)
a mutual decision. See id. 57.
45. STmaR.aN 1, 174-76, 228; Sternlieb, Slum Housing: A Functional Analysis, 32 LAw &
CONTEMn. PROB. 349, 352-53 (1967); interview with Charles Love, tenant union organizer,
in Chicago, May 2, 1967.
46. P. Rossi, WHY FAiLmiES fovE 97 (1955).
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with specific defects causes many slum tenants to move, despite the
knowledge that new housing is likely to be as bad as what the tenant left
behind.4 7 Without hope of improvement in the present dwelling, how-
ever, a poor family will pick up and move anyway. Since a new land-
lord ordinarily requires a security deposit, a tenant often omits the last
month's rent at the old apartment. By creating a sense of group partici-
pation among tenants in the management of the building, the tenant
union might halt the constant movement from one substandard apart.
ment to another.48 Of course, to the extent that rent skips are the last
resort of impoverished people spending money they do not have, not
even the union can accomplish anything useful.
B. Tenant Labor
Besides cutting costs to the landlord, tenants can contribute their
own labor to improve their living conditions. Informal, in-kind rent
payments already occur in large areas of the slum housing market. Many
landlords, for example, offer the new tenant a month's free rent if he
cleans his own apartment when he moves in.49 Mutual distrust between
landlord and tenant sharply limits the value of such agreements 0 The
mere existence of the arrangements, however, suggests that they could
become an additional "rent" payment plowed directly back into the
building where lessor and lessee are both assured of adequate super-
vision. A tenant union can devise varieties of "sweat rent";"1 a landlord,
for example, might reduce the rent where the tenant repairs the apart-
ment with landlord-supplied materials. Obviously such arrangements
will depend on the desires of the tenants. But if they want better hous-
ing and are willing to invest additional effort to get it, they should be
47. Interviews with Charles Love, Tony Henry, and Richard Rothstein, tenant union
organizers, in Chicago, May 1-3, 1967.
48. See M. CLINARD, SLUMS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 125-28, 299-308 (1966): NA-
TIONAL AssoCIATION OF HousING AND REDEVELOPMENT OFFICIALS, supra note 8, at 27, 37;
Sax & Hiestand, supra note 26, at 873; Cf. J. JAcoBs, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT
A ERCAN CmTEs 270-90 (1961).
49. See, e.g., B. Steck, JOIN Rent Strikes and Tenant Unions 9 (1966) (copy on file at
the Yale Law Journal).
50. Id.
51. Self-help and sweat equity plans have traditionally been associated with lionte
building by future owners. See Nesbitt, "Self-Help" Homebuilding, 24 J. HOUIsNO 275
(1967); Wall St. Journal, Nov. 13, 1967, at 1, col. 1. In addition, sweat equity plans have
been advocated for building low-income cooperatives or condominiums. See Davis, Co.
operative Self-Help Housing, 32 LAw 9- CONTEMP. PROD. 409 (1967). Tenant unions may,
of course, prepare the way for cooperative or condominium ownership of buildings. Letter
from Victor de Grazia, executive vice-president, Kate Maremont Foundation, to the Yale
Law Journal, July 11, 1967; cf. Quirk, "Wein & Gomberg, A Draft Program of Housing
Reform-The Tenant Condominium, 53 CO NELL L. REv. 361, 390-93 (1968).
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allowed-if not urged-to proceed.5- The tenant union remains the
only feasible device to ensure the workability of tenant-labor plans.
C. Picking the Deep Pocket
The tenant union, of course, need not limit its goals to the housing
improvements which can be financed through lowered operating costs
or tenant labor. The landlord as investor and profit-maker represents
the most obvious potential source of increased maintenance funds. The
extent to which a landlord has profits to yield to a tenant union,
however, will depend on several variables: the rate of return demanded
by the landlord; the condition of the housing market; and the stage of
deterioration of the building.
The ultimate constraint on the rewards the union can hope to win
from the landlord is the rate of return the landlord requires to stay in
the housing business. This required rate of return takes account of
(1) the return presently available on safe investments, e.g., government
bonds; (2) the probability that the property will continue to generate
income; and (3) the property's liquidity (how easily it can be sold and
the collateral value of the property). Uncertainty about a steady flow
of income, about the eventual ease of selling the property, and about
the effort required to run the building will cause an investor to demand
a high rate of return. Investors regard all rental housing as a risky
investment,-a and slum housing is not only the most uncertain market,
but the social disapproval attendant upon the epithet of "slumlord"
tends to push the necessary rate of return even higher." The tenant
union, if it can reduce some of these risks and uncertainties by stabiliz-
ing landlord-tenant relations, ° may be the only institution capable of
exerting a downward pressure on the rate of return necessary to keep
landlords in business.
In many instances, however, the landlord's profits exceed the return
necessary to keep him from abandoning his buildings. Housing markets
52. Many tenants do make an effort to maintain apartments despite lack of coopera-
tion from their landlords. Committee of the House of Representatives on Slum Housing
and Rent Gouging, 74th Illinois General Assembly, Report June 1, 1965, at 4 (mimeo-
graphed) [hereinafter dted as illinois Slum Housing Report]. See TEzNANTs' iciMrrs 10.
53. See Hollebaugh, Income Approach to Value in E_cyCoPrEm OF REAL EsrATE Ar-
PRAJSING 54, 60-63 (E. Friedman ed. 1959); L WiNNICm, RTrr. HousING: OrrUrsN
FOR PRIVATE INVESr AMN-r 103-09 (1958).
54. L. WINNICK, supra note 53, at 99-102.
55. SmTaum 95-96; L. VINNICK, supra note 53, at 102; cf. Note, Enforcement of fMu.
nicipal Housing Codes, 78 HAiv. L. REv. 801, 811-12 (1965).
56. Cf. North, Appraisal of Apartment Buildings, in ENcyCopEI OF REAL EsTATE Ar-
PRAISING 194, 197 (E. Friedman ed. 1959).
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vary widely in different parts of the country.57 In some cities housing
for the poor may be a dying industry,s but in a substantial proportion
of slum markets demand outruns supply.0 Even though the central
cities have been losing their white population to the suburbs for nearly
20 years, in-migration of the poor-and chiefly the Negro poor-has
replaced most of the fleeing middle class. Racial and social discrimina-
tion, as well as the more conventional disabilities of impoverished
consumers, such as lack of knowledge, have kept the recent arrivals
crowded into much smaller geographical areas than those deserted by
middle-class emigrants. 0
Not only is the demand for low-cost housing high, but the supply
of low-cost housing is limited. Given the rents low-income people can
pay, it is not economically feasible to build new units. 1 Additional
housing for low-income tenants becomes available as higher-income
households vacate older for newer housing units. The older units then
"filter down" to low-income tenants. 2 Even the limited housing made
available by the filtering process is further restricted by "block pattern-
ing" which allows only buildings on the fringes of already-existing
slums to filter down.63 In such a tight housing market, landlords often
57. Vacancy rates, rent levels, and expenses vary wildly from region to region, and city
to city. See INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT, 1967 APARTMENT BUILDING INCOME
EXPENsE ANALYSIS 3, 6-9 (1967); IV. GRIGSBY, HOUSING MARKETS AND PUBLIC POLICY 16065
(1963). Intensity of discrimination and the extent of substandard housing also fluctuate
from city to city. See Nesbitt & Hoeber, The Fair Housing Committee: Its Need for a
New Perspective, 41 LAND ECON. 98, 102 Table 11 (1965).
58. See, e.g., STERNFay 88-93, 103-06. Newark may be a special case, however, since It
has one of the highest ratios of public housing units to population of any city in the
country. More than ten per cent of Newark's dwelling units are in public housing de-
velopments. STERNLmB 13-14. Despite a high vacancy rate rents in the slums do not fall.
Rather they remain at the same high levels established when demand was high. A. Scaim,
supra note 42, at 109; STERNr 93, 225-26.
59. The housing market is very fragmented; for example, large apartments able to
house adequately the many large, low-income families of the slums are in terribly short
supply in most slum housing markets. Interview with Tony Henry, tenant union organizer,
in Chicago, May 2, 1967; interview witth Elliott Segal, director, Division of Neighborhood
Improvement, New Haven, Conn., in New Haven, Nov. 13, 1967. The vacancy rate in New
York is still very low throughout the entire housing market. C. RAmPiN, THE PIVATE
RENTAL HOUsING MARKET IN NEw YORK CITY, 1965, at 9 (1966).
60. J. ROTHENBERG, ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF URBAN RENEWAL 44, 45-46 (1967) [here.
inafter cited as ROTHENBERG]; M. MEYERSON, B. TERB'rr, & W. WHEATON, HOUSING, Pro.
PLE, AND CrrIEs 75-76 (1962); K. TA~uBER & A. TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIrs 24-25, 166,69
(1965). The substantial rate of homebuilding during the 1950's reduced the rate of increase
of overcrowding, but did not halt it. K. TAEUBFR & A. TAXUBER, supra, at 166-69. The high
interest rates of the mid-1960's have severely reduced home construction, indicating that
pressure on existing housing may increase again, Naylor, The Impact of Fiscal and Mone.
tary Policy on the Housing Market, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 384, 389 (1967).
61. M. MEYERSON, B. TEmRErr, & W. WHEATON, supra note 60, at 294; ROTHENBERG 39,
Sax & Hiestand, supra note 26, at 873-74; A. ScHORRt, supra note 42, at 98.
62. Filtering has become a much-debated concept. W. GRIGSBY, HOUSING MAsirs AND
PUBLIC POLICY 84-130 (1963). As used in the text, filtering refers to a change in occupancy.
See id. 86. See also ROTHENBERG 38-39; A. SCo., supra note 42, at 108-10.
63. See B. DUNCAN & P. HAUSER, HOUSING A MEROrPOCs-CICcAo 219 (1960) and
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can increase rents without fear of losing tenants." Under these cir-
cumstances, the tenant union should be able to attack the "spread"
between the required rate of return and the rent charges based simply
on what the market will bear.
If the structure of the slum market creates one opportunity for land-
lord profiteering, the rhythm of housing deterioration creates another.
When a building first enters the slum market, it is a prime candidate
for "milking";65 that is, while in later years the building will require
significant repair expenditures to stave off actual collapse, during the
period of descent the landlord need perform no maintenance work at
all. The landlord may find it more profitable to collect the Tents and
milk the building as it deteriorates than to attempt to maintain his
investment through repairs. In order to serve a low-income market, the
landlord must be permitted to reduce services somewhat; however,
when a landlord attempts to extract huge profits in a short period of
time by a cataclysmic change in maintenance policy, permitting the
building to deteriorate rapidly and totally, the tenant union can
attempt to reverse the policy without driving the landlord out of busi-
ness.
Central to the landlord's financial ability to increase maintenance
expenditures are his own skill in managing the building, the extent
of his personal resources, and his own attitude toward his holdings.
Discussions of tenant unions too often typecast all landlords as fungible
villains. Actually, landlords fall into three general classes whose motive
for owning and techniques of managing slum properties differ: the
owner-occupant, the absentee professional, and the absentee amateur.
1. The Owner-Occupant
Owner-occupants constitute the largest group numerically; they
usually control from one-third to one-half the buildings in deteriorating
authorities cited note 61 supra. Racial discrimination maintains a dual housing market
even in buildings next door to each other. STrraurn 71.
64. A. ScnoaR, supra note 42, at 109.
65. The decision to permit a building to deteriorate is often accompanied by a con-
version of the building to Negro occupancy and a rise in the rent levels. In Chicago, one
apartment complex displayed practically this process dearly. Service wvas substantially
reduced, rents were increased, and the landlord actively advertised for Negro tenants.
Tenants' Action Council, Survey of Apartments at Old Town Gardens, May 1966 (copy
on file at Yale Law journal); testimony of David McCullough, Tenants' Action Council,
before Illinois Commission on Low-income Housing, Sept. 1967 (copy on file at Yale Law
journal). See N. GLAzER & D. McENTRE, S=uams IN HousNG AxND M onrMY Groups 167-70
(1960); Note, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing. 53 CAu..
L. REv. 304, 820 n.83 (1965).
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areas.6 According to a ghetto clich6, the resident-owned structure is
readily identified by the grass in the front yard in contrast to the barren
dirt plot prickling with glass shards characteristic of the absentee-owned
building.67 A recent study of Newark slums concluded that owner-
occupancy is the best guarantee of a well-maintained building.0 The
owner may be a white who has elected to remain in the building he
owns or a middle-class Negro who finds that he can buy housing only
in the slum; in either case, his presence in the building provides the
interest in decent housing, constant supervision, and day-to-day main.
tenance that old housing requires. 9 The resident owner's investment of
money and labor often is substantial.70 As a result most owner-occupied
tenements do not need tenant unions. The resident landlord already
provides adequate maintenance; pride of ownership has motivated
greater effort in screening and supervising tenants. Tenant response to
concerned resident landlords, moreover, is typically good; resident
landlords, in marked contrast to their absentee cousins, rarely feel that
their tenants cause problems. 1
Slum residents attracted by the American dream of owning their own
home can, however, be drawn over their financial heads by unscrupu-
lous real estate operators. Often two- or three-flat homes in slums or
fringe areas are sold on land contracts72 or are financed through second
mortgages taken back by the seller.73 Although the details and precise
legal effects of these transactions differ, their practical effect is similar:
almost no down payment is required, and the purchase price is often
double the actual worth of the building.1 4 Typically the seller has
tailored the monthly payments to his buyer, which is to say as high as
66. STERNLIEB 134. In the worst portion of Sternlieb's study area the percentage fell to
24 per cent, id., and in one of Chicago's worst slums some 18 per cent of the buildings
were owner-occupied. COM?%IUNrry RENEWAL PROGRAM, CITY OF CHICAGO, LAWNDALE, PART
ONE 11 (1964 .
67. Interview with Charles Love, tenant union organizer, in Chicago, May 2, 1967;
see Illinois Slum Housing Report 4-5.
68. STERiNLIEB 173-76, 228.
69. Id.
70. See W. GIGsBY, supra note 57, at 236.
71. Sternlieb, Slum Housing: A Functional Analysis, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 849,
352 n.3 (1967).
72. CHICAGO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, SELLING AND BUYING REAL ESTATE IN
A RACIALLY CHANGING NEIGHBORHOOD 8-9 (1962). The land contract can, of course, be t
legitimate business transaction. See H. HOAGLAND & L. STONE, REAL E TATE FINANcx 137.
53 (1965). For solutions to some of the abuses of land contract sales, see ILLINOIS COMi1lS.
SION 32-33.
73. L. LAURENTI, PROPERTY VALUES AND RACE 214-16 (1960); STERNLIFna 114-16, See gen.
erally L. GREBLER & J. GILLus, JUNIOR MORTGAGE FINANCING IN Los ANGELES COUNTY 1958.
1959, at 65 passim (1960).
74. CHICAGO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, supra note 72, at 5-6, 9; STERNLIEB 116,
145. See H. HOAGLAND & L. STONE, supra note 72, at 99-100.
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the buyer can conceivably afford to pay. Rarely does the purchaser have
any money in reserve for adequate maintenance.75 Such transactions
have another attraction for the seller: responsibility for maintenance
and housing code violations shifts to the unwary buyer.7 Not even the
most militant tenant union confronting a resident landlord who is no
better off than his tenants can hope to accomplish much.
2. The Absentee Professional Landlord
The main target of tenant union activity will be the absentee land-
lord. At the furthest extreme from the owner-resident is the large-scale
slum specialist. 77 Besides owning many buildings, the slumlord, at
least in larger cities, tends to own the biggest ones. Therefore, large
landlords while owning only 20 or 30 per cent of slum buildings often
control up to 40 or 50 per cent of the dwelling units.78 In dealing with
the large landlord, the tenant union faces a businessman who, by virtue
of his size, has access to capital, runs an integrated business, and is
actively interested in improving his operation.
Financing in slum markets is notoriously difficult to obtain; most
legitimate financial institutions are reluctant to loan money into the
slums.79 When they do, they require the owner to sign personally. Thus
approval of the loan often depends as much on the owner's personal
credit as on the valuation of the property.80 The consequence of this
practice is that large landlords, once they have established themselves
with a bank, find it easier to obtain money-and on better terms-
than owner-occupants. The large holder also employs his own work
crew, writes his own insurance, and does his own capital improvements,
thus realizing economies not available to the smaller owner.8' Finally,
75. STm UsNr 150; interview with Elliott Segal, director, Division of Neighborhood Im-
provement, New Haven, Conn., in New Haven, Nov. 13, 1967.
76. See Illinois Slum Housing Report 3.
77. STErNxm 124, 137.
78. Most figures on ownership are, unfortunately, tabulated by number of parcels
owned instead of number of dwelling units. In one Chicago neighborhood, one-quarter
of the buildings contain one-half of the dwelling units. CosmuNrr" RENEWAL PROCRAM,
Crry oF CHICAcO, supra note 66, at 12. In most cases, these larger buildings are managed
by large, professional landlords. Interview with Irving Gerick, Community Renewal
Foundation, in Chicago, May 2, 1967; see letter from George Sternlieb to Yale Law Journal
Dec. 6, 1967; cf. L. WNMNICK, supra note 53, at 85 n.3.
79. ROTHBERG 51; STENLIEB 107-12; J. JACOBS, supra note 48, at 291-317. The credit
that is available is more expensive than credit elsewhere. MAmacwUSErrs Cofi~ssio:' 6;
see Grigsby, Home Finance and Housing Quality in Aging Neighborhoods, in Tim Eco-
NOMIc PROBLEMS OF HousnGo 105 (A. Nevitt ed. 1967).
80. Interview with John Hackett, mortgage specialist, New Haven Redevelopment
Authority, in New Haven, Nov. 9, 1967; see CHIcAGo Co m 'N o. HuTWN RELATIONS,
supra note 72, at 10; W. NASH, RESDENTIAL REHABIILrATIoN PIuv'rn' PnoFrs AND PunUc
PuposEs 109 (1959).
81. Illinois Slum Housing Report 2.
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he is a businessman with an investment to protect; he is likely to respond
with economic sophistication to sensible union proposals.
8 2
Limits to the ability of the large landlord to respond to tenant union
demands do, of course, exist. The large landlord, like all real estate
investors, wants to tie up as little capital as possible in any given build-
ing; 3 he will seek to obtain 70, 80, or 90 per cent financing of the
purchase price. Thus using the mortgage instrument as a leverage
device, he can minimize his equity capital in any one structure and
enable himself to multiply his holdings with a limited amount of
capital. Nor is the practice by large-scale landlords of fully mortgaging
their properties wholly undesirable from the tenant's point of view.
Because debt capital carries an interest rate substantially less than the
rate of return that an investor in the risky slum housing market de-
mands on his own money, a high debt-equity ratio lowers the total
rent the landlord must charge.8 4 But the heavily mortgaged landlord
loses flexibility since he must meet regularly recurring mortgage pay-
ments; in addition, just as his equity investment in any single building
is small, his expected profit is small in absolute terms for each building.
This factor can cause trouble for the union; one hundred dollars will
not go far toward rehabilitating a tenement no matter whether it
represents a five or a fifty per cent return to the investor. Nevertheless,
the large landlord remains a tempting target because of his powerful
financial position.
3. The Absentee Amateur
By contrast, the small absentee amateur owning only a few buildings
is often a landlord more or less by happenstance and typically manages
his property with markedly less financial acumen than his professional
counterpart. Often a marginal capitalist, the small absentee owner has
few, if any, available sources of capital to put into the buildings;86
the building's operation will be the main source of funds for additional
maintenance expenditures. But the unique position of many small
amateurs may make this source of funds fairly lucrative. Often the small
owner used to live in the building and, although he moved long ago,
still holds title. He may have inherited his holdings or otherwise be-
82. See W. NASH, supra note 80, at 109.
83. See S'm rwam 79.
84. See L. WINNICK, supra note 53, at 107-08.
85. Interview with Richard Rothstein, tenant union organizer, in Chicago, May 2,
1967; STaaR r-x 138.
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come a fortuitous small-time investor.8" Due to his long continuous
ownership, he may own the building outright with no outstanding
mortgage; 7 when this is true, the rental income from the building will
be potentially available for maintenance expenditures since the land-
lord has no mortgage payments to meet. If, however, the title holder
faces heavy mortgage payments, the tenant union faces a bleaker pros-
pect of obtaining meaningful concessions.8"
Furthermore, the amateur is likely to manage his building ineptly, or
to be bilked by large companies hired to repair or service the building for
him.s9 His primary desire is often for non-involvement; he wants only
to collect the rent and wash his hands of the rest.Y The tenant union
represents an excellent device to prevent such behavior and to insist
that the owner reinvest some of the revenue generated by the building.
The tenant union may, however, find the small owner less impressed by
rational economic arguments than his large professional counterpart
and therefore a harder individual to bargain with.01
III. The Balance of Advantage in Landlord-Tenant Bargaining
A. Bargaining Power
Can the tenant union obtain housing improvements where more
traditional legal remedies have failed? Even if the landlord has profits
the loss of which will not drive him from the market, he will fight any
effort to extract them. And even where the union seeks only to improve
housing by lowering operating costs and contributing its own effort, it
will have to convince the landlord that good faith bargaining is not
against his interest. Whether the union will be able to lead the landlord
to the negotiating table, and what it will obtain once there, will hinge
on the strength of the union, the type of landlord, conditions in the
housing market, and the building's state of deterioration. The union
derives its strength from the only source available to it: collective
action. To maximize its power, it must organize a significant proportion
86. L. GREBL.R, EXPERIENCE IN URBAN REAL E TrATE INVESTMbENT 183-84 (195); STEn.-
LmB 124, 152.
87. Interview with Meredith Gilbert, tenant union organizer, in Chicago, May 2, 1967.
One of the longest tenant union rent strikes in Chicago was against an aged woman who
owned nine buildings free of any mortgage obligation. Id. In Stemlieb's study, more than
15 per cent of the sample parcels showed no mortgage outstanding. STEENLUM 108-10.
88. See SERN Nm 118; Steck, supra note 49, at 17.
89. Illinois Slum Housing Report 2-3; L. GRELER, supra note 86, at 18..
90. Smnmim 124; interviews with Tony Henry and Meredith Gilbert, tenant union
organizers, in Chicago, May 2, 1967.
91. STEmRNM 124.
1383
The Yale Law Journal
of the buildings owned or managed by the landlord it confronts. -"
Unless it can do so, the union probably cannot obtain the leverage to
bring the landlord to the negotiating table.
Widespread picketing and rent withholding are the most potent
forces to convince the landlord to bargain. Even if both tactics en-
counter no resistance in the courts,03 how likely are they to be effective?
The landlord has three major weapons at his disposal to break a
recognition drive by the union. Chief among them is eviction. A tenant
union may be unable, as a legal matter, to prevent eviction of tenants
who withhold their rent. 4 The tightness of the slum housing market is
obviously a prime determinant of the landlord's enthusiasm for evicting
tenants. But even if the market is tight, the tenant union's numbers
may give the landlord pause. Turnover is expensive, and the landlord
may be reluctant to evict a significant portion of his tenantry even if
replacements are clamoring at the doors. 0 The fact that the union is
likely to include his more reliable and steady tenants should further
stay his hand.9 Most potent, however, is the expense attendant upon
evictions by legal process, running anywhere from $50 to $100 a tenant07
-a substantial deterrent to wholesale emptying of the building.
Second, the landlord may simply cease to service his building. 8 The
threat of such action in a middle-class building might be compelling;
but in a slum tenement total discontinuance of services may represent
virtually no change from the status quo, particularly if the tenants have
92. Organizing all the buildings owned by one landlord instead of organizing in.
dividual buildings or blocks represented a sharp departure from traditional community
organizing techniques. This important shift in tactics was recommended by labor union
officials. Interview with Tony Henry, tenant union organizer, in Chicago, May 2, 1967.
93. See part IV infra.
94. Even if the existence of a union rent withholding campaign would not constitute
a valid defense to eviction for non-payment, the union may be able to halt any eviction
on the basis of state laws.
95. Precise costs are not available for private landlords, but ten years ago public
housing officials estimated the cost of turnover at about $100 every time one family moved
out and another moved in. PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE
AGENCY, MOBILITY AND MOTIVATIONS 5 (1958).
96. The tenants most likely to join and work actively for the union are those most
interested in better housing; from the landlord's perspective, these tenants are often the
most stable and reliable. Interview with Tony Henry, tenant union organizer, in Chicago,
May 2, 1967.
97. The cost is calculated on the fees involved in cases where marshals must move a
family out of an apartment. In Chicago, a landlord must pay eight dollars a room plus
eight dollars a floor for every floor above the first. Fees for serving process and for mileage
usually add another ten dollars per tenant to the total cost. Telephone interview with
Evictions Section, Municipal Court of Chicago, May 3, 1967.
98. ILLINOIS COMMISSION 19; interview with Meredith Gilbert, tenant union organizer,
in Chicago, May 2, 1967; testimony by Victor Spallone, Chief, Bureau of Housing, Cook
County Dep't of Public Aid, before the Illinois House of Representatives Comm. on Pub.
lic Welfare, May 2, 1967, at 3 (copy on file at the Yale Law Journal); Note, Rent With.
holding: Public and Private, 48 CHI. B. RECORD 18 n.20 (Jan. 1967).
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already been paying for all heat and utilities themselves. Even so, the
landlord's refusal to provide any service or to make any repairs places
a substantial burden on the tenants, who must then arrange to replace
whatever minimal service the landlord used to offer. Of course, neither
landlord nor tenant can be enthusiastic about the cessation of all service
for any substantial period of time; the building will only deteriorate all
the faster.
Third, and most drastically, the landlord may threaten to abandon
the building or to take if off the marketg--a threat made more credible
if he has already stopped servicing the structure. Few landlords have
carried through the threat to abandon, however, because such action
not only forfeits all hope of profit, but also may entail a serious capital
loss.
Against the tactics available to the landlord, the union can pitch its
weapons of rent withholding and picketing. The former is likely to be
the more potent; the landlord's need for a steady flow of rent money to
meet mortgage payments will make him feel the pinch rapidly and pain-
fully when his revenue is cut off.100 But picketing, although not so
powerful a tool as in the labor context, will also have its impact.
Besides the social and political pressures on the landlord that inevitably
accompany a strike, the publicity and discord it generates, especially
when accompanied by a rent-withholding campaign, may stimulate the
threat of a code enforcement crackdown which might be more drastic
in its impact than the tenants' demands.
Such pressures, however, will not have the same impact on large and
smali landlords. Along with the larger landlord's greater potential for
significant response goes the correspondingly greater capacity to resist.
Beyond his willingness to test the staying power of the union, the or-
ganizers may have trouble recruiting and holding large numbers of
tenants in many scattered buildings. 1 1 Small, highly mortgaged land-
lords, on the other hand, often acquiesce to union demands in fairly
short order, though the concessions that the union wins may not be
impressive. 0 2 The small absentee landlord who owns his building free
99. Interview with Charles Love, tenant union organizer, in Chicago, May 2, 1967;
cf. N.Y. Times, April 20, 1968, at 19, col. 3.
100. While rent is withheld, the landlord confronts a steadily increasing enticement to
settle from the growing escrow account of tenant rent payments.
101. Locating most of the buildings owned by the same landlord is itself a difficult
task. In addition, creating an organization with many scattered subunits poses more dif-
ficulties. Usually the success of the union depends upon finding one or two tenants in
a building who are willing to devote large amounts of time to org and maintaining
the union. Interviews with tenant union organizers, in Chicago, May, g1967. See generally
M. CLmmAnD, supra note 33, at 166-87.
102. See Steck, supra note 49, at 8, 10.
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and clear is the one landlord who has been willing to let a union rent-
withholding action drag on. 03 His lack of personal or financial involve-
ment in the building makes him the most difficult landlord for the
union to bargain with.
Housing market conditions will be an important determinant of the
landlord's willingness to settle, In a tight market the landlord may be
more willing to evict unionized tenants; a weak market, conversely, can
induce the landlord to keep his present tenants and, therefore) to
bargain with the union in good faith. The nature of the market may
also work in the opposite direction, however, and unions may actually
fare better in healthy housing markets with strong demand, where
landlords feel they can bargain and still earn a good, continuing profit,
than in severely depressed markets where the owners look on themselves
as the last holdoiits in a dying industry.104
The condition of the buildings will also determine the success or
failure of union efforts. The building that has not yet deteriorated
beyond hope of economically feasible rehabilitation holds the most
promise. It does not require a major infusion of funds to provide decent,
adequate housing for the tenants.105 Here the tenant union will seek to
ensure constant and continued maintenance, Some observers think the
situation considerably bleaker in badly deteriorated tenements; 00 there
the union will probably accomplish little more than improved daily
maintenance ard greater responsiveness to recurring tenant complaints,
but major improvements will be financially impracticable. Nonetheless,
walls are better without holes than with them; minor repairs can make
a significant difference in the habitability of an apartment 107
103. One rent withholding action dragged on for nine months before the landlord,
who owned nine buildings without any mortgages, agreed to negotiate. Interview with
Meredith Gilbert, tenant union organizer, in Chicago, May 2, 1967.
104. In either case, the landlord will not be eager to meet union demands. However,
in a tight market, a landlord does not invest because he thinks It unnecessary, while In
a Weak market he fears for his investment. ST.MLsB 226, Therefore, in a tight market, a
union could convince him that it was necessary to invest some of his profits In better
maintenance.
105. Before a building has been allowed to deteriorate, the expense required to keep it
in good condition does not appear to be significantly higher than the maintenance expense
of a badly deteriorated building. STERNLE B 77.
106. Note, Tenant Unions: An Experiment in Private Law Making, in HosiN FoR
THE POOR: RIGHTs AND RE EwIs 100, 115-19 (New York University School of Law, Project
on Social Welfare Law, Supplement 1967).
107. Some writers have speculated that a tenant union could not be held together
unless it produced very substantial improvement. Note, Tenant Unions: An Experiment
in Private Law Making, supra note 106, at 118, However, success of a tenant union de-
pends entirely upon the work and organization of the tenants involved. In some buildings,
militant, hard-working tenants have made unions flourish with widely varying degress of
rehabilitation; elsewhere, tenants have lost interest when they realized that total rehabill.
tation was not possible. But easy generalizations are not possible. Interviews with Gilbert
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Perhaps the single most important element in the economics of
tenant unions is the novelty of the institution and the attendant specu-
lativeness of analysis. Many factors will determine the conditions under
which the unions can function effectively. Without regard to theory,
unions have sprung up in widely different circumstances across the
country, from a low-income housing project in Michigan, to a middle-
income complex in Chicago, from the badly dilapidated West Side
slums of Chicago to a series of one-family, middle-class dwellings in
suburban Harvey, Illinois.108 It is too early to conclude that tenant
unions can exist only in certain economic environments but not in
others; perhaps because their leaders forget to peruse the journals, they
have so far defied all such limits.
B. Lessons from the Past
Even if the union's bargaining power brings the landlord to the
conference table, the checkered history of legal efforts to improve slum
housing might be thought to cast doubt on the tenant union's ability
to obtain significant improvement of slum housing. But arguments
based on the inadequacy of traditional legal remedies fail to note both
the inherent limitations of earlier legal devices and the correspondingly
greater potential of the tenant union.
The irreversible nature of housing deterioration makes the tenant
union an especially promising tactic against the landlord intent upon
milking a presently adequate building. The process of deterioration is
asymmetrical: it is easy to let a building go, but virtually impossible
to reverse the process. 0 9 Once the building has deteriorated sub-
stantially because maintenance requirements have been ignored, the
building may cost more to rehabilitate than it is worth. Traditional
legal remedies for inadequate housing have not been able to prevent the
landlord from carrying out the decision to allow his structure to deteri-
orate into a slum tenement. The landlord will make token efforts to
mask the deterioration taking place. Particularly because of the hap-
hazard enforcement of such laws, by the time the building has clearly
fallen below the minimal standards set by the housing code it will be
too late.110 The landlord has milked the building of the profits in it;
Cornfield, tenant union attorney, and Tony Henry, tenant union organizer, in Chicago,
May 2, 1967.
108. See authorities cited notes 7 & 9 supra.
109. RonmNBEGc 47-48; cf. Note, Tenant Initiated Repairs: New Yorh's Article 7-A,
2 HAv. Crv. Riirrs-Civ. Lm. L. Rrv. 201, 207 n.48 (1967).
110. Both administrative and equal protection problems have prevented housing code
enforcement agencies from achieving completely effective code compliance. Note, Enforce-
ment of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801, 810-11 (1955).
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only the badly deteriorated husk is left; the damage has been done with
crushing finality. Legal action after the fact cannot force restoration
of the building.""
The tenant union, in contrast, can act early enough to prevent the
landlord from profiting by his own inaction; before the structure is
fatally blighted,1 2 the union can negotiate for an acceptable standard
of maintenance based on rent paid and earnings withdrawn 11 More-
over, the tenant union builds on its own success. It creates machinery
to bring continuing pressure to bear on the landlord, unlike tradi-
tional legal remedies where enforcement is intermittent at best and
the time and effort involved in bringing a second code prosecution or
rent-withholding action are the same as in the first."
4
Even where the building has deteriorated to the point that it cannot
generate enough income to bring it up to code requirements, the tenant
union enjoys an advantage over traditional legal remedies. Code pros-
ecutions and welfare receiverships set unrealistic goals for many build-
ings.115 Invoking administrative remedies precludes a strategy of flex-
ibility and gradualism;" 6 to avoid the threatened sanction, the landlord
must bring his building up to code requirements. Yet demanding all or
nothing too often gets nothing. When the structure has already been
milked, capital investment to meet requirements is simply uneco-
nomical: the landlord will abandon the building rather than waste
money upon it. Serious penalties, such as jail terms or high fines, have
never materialized to deter this type of behavior. 17 The tenant union,
on the other hand, can tailor its demands to the possible. Many tenant
111. See N.Y. Times, April 20, 1968, at 19, cols. 3-5.
112. Ironically, of course, this type of building may be the most difficult to organize
because tenants may not perceive the necessity for organizing. In one large apartment
complex in Chicago, however, the tenants responded well to organizers since they clearly
saw the buildings begin to deteriorate. See note 65 supra. Furthermore, middl.class
tenants may prove easier to organize than very low-income families in badly deteriorated
buildings.
113. The afialogy to the labor union here is striking; if an employer claims economic
inability to meet the union's demands, the Court has held that the employer must sub.
stantiate his economic hardship. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956);
Yakima Frozen Foods, 130 N.L.R.B. 1269 (1961).
114. In old buildings, there must be constant supervision and maintenance. Even If
court action produces repairs, the building may rapidly deteriorate to its pre-repair con.
dition unless maintenance is continuous. If the tenants have to go to court following each
deterioration, the expense and trouble may not prove worth the result. See Note, Tenant
Initiated Repairs: New York's Article 7-A, 2 HARV. Civ. RiIrrs-Ctv. Lrn. L. REy. 201, 207
n.48 (1967).
115. See Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HAv. L. REv, 801, 811-12
(1965); Sternlieb, Slum Housing: A Functional Analysis, 32 LAw 8- CONTEIMP. PRO,. ,149,
354-55 (1967).
116. Interview with Irving Gerick, Director, Community Renewal Foundation, in
Chicago, May 2, 1967; cf. N.Y. Times, April 20, 1968, at 19, cols. 3-5.
117. Authorities cited note 21 supra.
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complaints fall far short of an insistence upon major repairs; they look
only for a few trash containers, janitorial service, locks on doors, mail-
boxes, or patching for the walls." 8 Rehabilitation may be the ideal, but
where it is unattainable a formalized procedure for handling complaints
which the landlord can afford to remedy represents considerable
progress.
IV. The Law of Tenant Unions
Most landlords have stoutly resisted tenant-union organization from
the time the first leaflet was slipped into the tenant's mailbox until
just before they signed on the dotted line; several have turned to the
courts for help in resisting tenant organizing. Generally, the cases have
been settled before a decision came down.n 9 Consequently, few opin-
ions have indicated the tenor of judicial reaction to tenant unionism.
But several lines of precedent exist to which courts are likely to turn
for guidance in adjudicating the conflicts that arise betveen union and
landlord at the various stages of union organization.
A. Organizing: the Foot in the Door
At the outset union organizers canvass door-to-door and distribute
leaflets to inform tenants of the union's activities and to recruit tenants
for union meetings. The tenant's right to possession should protect
such organizing activities from the landlord's attack on grounds of
trespass or invasion of privacy. Unlike the laborer who has no right
to possession in the company-owned factory, the tenant in an apartment
building has the right to receive anyone he desires in his leased
premises;12 in addition, he holds an easement or right-of-way over the
common hallways even though the landlord retains possession there.-2
Either an implied license arising from the existence of a bell in the
front hallway or the "habits of the country,"12-- or an actual invitation
to enter extended by the tenantm  will defeat the landlord's charge
of trespass.
24
118. Interviews with Tony Henry and Charles Love, tenant union organizers, in
Chicago, May 2, 1967.
119. Interview with Gilbert Cornfield, tenant union attorney, in Chicago, May 2, 197.
120. The tenant has the right to possession of the leased premises. I AmIsr-c,, LAw OF
PROPERTY § 3.38 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
121. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 639. 48 N.E.2d 678. 6S2 (1943);
Totten v. Phipps, 52 N.Y. 354, 357 (1873). See Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 123 (1952).
122. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 fass. 632, 640, 48 N.E.2d 678, 683 (1943).
123. Id.
124. Nor can the landlord rely on any blanket anti-solicitation statute to keep organizers
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B. Recognition: Purposes, Picketing, and Strikes
Once organized, the union typically has demanded that the landlord
recognize it as the sole bargaining agent for the tenants and negotiate
an agreement. With equal consistency, the landlord has refused,
thereby precipitating a union campaign of picketing and rent with.
holding. Judicial scrutiny of such tactics is likely to be extensive, and
courts will undoubtedly turn to the labor precedents for guidance.
The broad first amendment right to picket enunciated in Thornhill
v. Alabama 25 sprang from the utility and effectiveness of picketing as a
means of conveying and publicizing information.12 In the cases follow-
ing Thornhill, however, the Supreme Court realized that picketing
involved more than just communication; the physical presence of
patrolling pickets produced not only traffic problems such as the block-
ing of sidewalks or entrances to buildings, but also coercion.127 Under
proper circumstances, the Court held, the state could regulate both the
traffic128 and coercion 129 aspects of picketing despite its usefulness as a
means of communication.
Even where picketing generates coercion-as it almost always does
when the union pickets a business establishment-the Supreme Court
has carved only a specific exception to the scope of first amendment
protection. The state may enjoin the picketing only where the object
sought by the picketers violates a legitimate, dearly defined state law
or policy. Provided the state law is valid, a state court may enjoin the
picketers either from breaking the law themselves or from coercing a
third party to break it. In upholding injunctions against labor picket-
ing, the Supreme Court has consistently based its decisions on a finding
below either that the union was violating a law or that it was attempt-
ing to force an employer to violate it.130
away. The organizers can claim a strong first amendment right to be heard-a proposition
dating back to the leaflet and doorbell cases of the 1940's, Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). There the Supreme Court upheld
the speaker's right to intrude on the privacy of an unwilling listener, at least for non-com-
mercial purposes; cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1951). Some writers have
thought that problems of recognition and stranger picketing would plague tenant unions.
See Note, supra note 106, at 130. But tenant unions are unlikely to picket buildings unless
they can gain some tenant support. And if the union has tenant support, the problems
posed by stranger and recognition picketing are irrelevant.
125. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
126. Id. at 104.
127. Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 854 U.S. 284, 293 (1957); Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 501, 503 (1949); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554.55
(1965) (dictum). See Jones, Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 VA.
L. REV. 1023 (1953).
128. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965).
129. See cases cited note 127 supra.
130. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Teamsters Local
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In Hughes v. Superior Court,'31 the Supreme Court extended the
analysis beyond the labor arena to a situation historically and ana-
lytically relevent to tenant unionism. Hughes, a Negro, picketed a
grocery store, demanding that a specific quota of Negro clerks be hired
based on the percentage of the store's Negro customers. The California
Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that if the store had refused
to hire Negroes, "picketing to protest it would not be for an unlawful
objective.' 132 But the controlling question in the case was different; it
was whether "the discriminatory hiring of a fixed proportion of Negro
employees," urged by the picketers, was itself lawful.13a Under earlier
California case law, the court said, an employer's agreement to hire
only Negroes in a fixed number of positions would be ille-al. 13  It
followed that the lower court's injunction of the picketing was proper,
and that Hughes' willful disobedience of the court order was properly
punishable as a contempt. On certiorari the Supreme Court accepted
the California court's determination of state public policy and held
that free speech considerations did not protect the picketing. "We
cannot construe the Due Process Clause," wrote Justice Frankfurter
for the majority, "as precluding California from securing respect for its
policy against involuntary employment on racial lines by prohibiting
systematic picketing that would subvert such policy."'13 Both the
California court and the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding,
that if the object of the picketers had differed ever so slightly-if they
had sought to prevent discrimination rather than to establish a Negro
quota-the state could not have enjoined the picketing since the
objective sought would not have violated a clear state law or policy"'a
Recognition picketing of a landlord's building and offices by a tenant
union does involve economic coercion. Its purpose is to force the land-
lord to the bargaining table. The courts will consequently face the
question whether the purposes of the picketing are lawful.13 T They may
retrogress to the "unlawful object" and "prima facie tort" doctrines
formerly invoked in criminal conspiracy and business interference
cases against the labor unions,138 But unlike the older courts, which had
309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 477 (1950); Building Service Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S.
532, 539-41 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
131. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
132. Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 855, 198 P.2d 885, 888 (1948).
133. Id. at 852, 198 P.2d at 886.
134. Id. at 855-57, 198 P.2d at 888-89.
135. 339 U.S. at 466.
136. Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 855, 198 P-9d 885, 888 (1948), af'd, 339
U.S. 460, 466 (1950).
137. See generally Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 1284, 1295-1307 (1964).
138. See F. FkANacrrm & N. GRwNE, TBE LABoR INjuxcroN 2446 (1920).
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few legislative pronouncements to guide them in their handling of
early labor disputes, the judges today can look to the Housing Act of
1949,139 state housing statutes, and municipal housing ordinances for
relevant policies to define their treatment of tenant unions. By picket-
ing, the tenant union seeks to force the landlord to bring his building
up to the legal minimum prescribed by the housing code, to create
orderly machinery for the resolution of tenant grievances, and to
improve substantially the quality of his tenement housing. Such objec-
tives, far from being unlawful or against public policy, parallel the
statutory purposes enunciated by Congress and state legislatures, Even
if the tenants' demands exceed the minimum requirements of the local
housing code, the more general legislative policy should lead the courts
to conclude that the picketing is lawful in its purpose. Congress has
committed the nation to "the goal of a decent home and a suitable
living environment for every American family,"' 4 and to "the policy
of... opening to everyone.., the opportunity to live in decency and
dignity."' 4' State and municipal housing laws imposing minimum
standards on multi-family dwellings coincide even more exactly with
the tenant union's aim of improving existing housing stock.
Consequently, the courts should not enjoin tenant union picketing
on the ground of unlawful purposes. They may instead question
whether the tenant union represents an appropriate means of ac-
complishing the end sought. Here the union's greatest burden will be
its novelty. But tenant unions are no more novel than congressional
desire for the participation of the poor in many recent government
programs. 42 In specifying the conditions under which federal aid is
available through the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,143 Congress
has given priority for community action grants to "programs which give
promise of effecting a permanent increase in the capacity of individuals,
groups, and communities to deal with their problems without further
assistance"; 14 and Congress has specified that community action pro-
grams generally should be conducted "with the maximum feasible
participation of the residents of the areas. '145 In states where the
legislature has authorized the welfare department to withhold rent or
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
140. Id.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1964).
142. The Illinois Supreme Court looked for congressional guidance in determining the
legality of picketing an allegedly discriminatory employer. Centennial Laundry Co. v. Wcst
Side Org., 34 111. 2d 257, 215 N.E.2d 443 (1966).
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2981 (1964).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2785(d) (1964).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2782(a)(3) (1964).
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Where statutory remedies have otherwise come to recognize the value
of tenant-initiated remedies,146 courts should find no justification for
enjoining tenant union activity per se.
One lower court, however, has found that the existence of housing
codes and their enforcement agencies cuts against tenant unions. One
New York supreme court in Springfield, Bayside Corp. v. Hochman"4 7
suggested that available statutory schemes should provide the exclusive
remedy for the aggrieved tenant. It is doubtful that sucl exclusiveness
was within the contemplation of the enacting legislature. The policy of
the argument is even more dubious; the widespread existence of slums
demonstrates that code enforcement and other remedies have not been
sufficient. Perhaps the court could reasonably suggest that tenants
in a middle-class ieighborhood with isolated housing code violations
should pursue an alternative remedy. But a similar suggestion to the
slum tenant means as a practical matter that he can do little about his
living conditions in the immediate future. 48A second New York court
has recently rejected the reasoning in Hochman and upheld tenant
picketing. 49
In addition, code enforcement is irrelevant to the tenant union's
basic demand of union recognition and negotiation of a collective agree-
ment. Such demands violate no law or policy of any state but instead
further the policy of self-reliance enunciated in the Economic Op-
portunity Act. 50 In labor disputes the early common-law courts, rec-
ognizing the possible improvement in wages and working conditions
to be as valid an economic concern as the avoidance of possible harm
to employers, never laid down a per se law outlawing labor unions.'0 '
Tenant unions offer the state the potential of a self-regulating system
to ameliorate housing conditions in the cities. Such considerations
should prevent the courts from subordinating the tenant union's
potential for improving housing to the protection of a landlord's
pocketbook.
52
Many tenant unions, however, have found that picketing alone does
not bring the landlord to the bargaining table, and have also resorted
146. See authorities cited notes 23 & 30 supra.
147. 44 Misc. 2d 882, 255 N.YS.2d 140 (1964).
148. The tenant, after all, is interested in better housing, not in seeing that his land-
lord pays a fine or goes to jail. See TENANms' lIGHs 10.
149. Dicta Realty Assoc. v. Shaw, 50 Misc. 2d 267, 270 N.Y.S.2d 342 (19G6).
150. See p. 1392 supra.
151. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111 (fass. 184; see F. FRAN iFuThr & N. GV.;M,
supra note 138, at 2-5.
152. At least courts should relegate the contending parties to the marketplace-assum-
ing peaceful behavior on both sides-until the legislature directs othem.,ise.
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to rent withholding. Without statutory authorization, the withholding
stands on more uncertain ground than picketing. Landlords have a
medley of theories on which they can seek to enjoin such union con-
duct: intentional tort, conspiracy in restraint of trade, and interference
with contractual relations.1 53 Such doctrines underlay the notorious
labor injunctions of the first third of the century, and they share a
tortured common-law history. In all of them, the landlord's claim for
relief will rest, as did that of his employer counterpart, on the injury
intentionally inflicted by the union.1 14 And in both situations, "the
damage inflicted by combative measures of a union-the strike, the
boycott, the picket-must win immunity by its purpose." 16 In defend-
ing rent withholding, the tenant union will find itself back in the
thicket of the "unlawful purpose" doctrine and means-ends analysis
prevailing in the picketing cases, but with no first amendment con-
siderations to weigh in the balance.
Still, the tenant union does stand in a better position than the early
labor union, insofar as the economics of rent withholding differ from
those of the labor strike. In the withholding action the union collects
the rent from tenants and places it in an escrow account. Unlike the
irretrievable loss caused an employer by a labor strike, the economic
"harm" inflicted on the landlord by rent withholding is temporary and
conditional solely upon his continued recalcitrance. To the extent that
the tenants stay on in the building, the landlord suffers no business loss
analogous to that incurred by the struck employer. The landlord has a
right of action against the tenants (and probably against the union as
well) for rent accruing from use and enjoyment of the premises.100 It
should be emphasized that the union's promise to repay the funds at
the end of the dispute is no fiction: in many instances the union has
furnished the landlord with an accounting of its rent collections and has
not intervened to prevent the eviction of tenants who paid their rent
to neither landlord nor union.1'i The tenants are not after free apart-
ments; they want their money's worth in better housing158
Courts, therefore, should find no justification for injecting their
power of injunction into such a situation. The landlord cannot satisfy
153. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 138, at 2-5, 24, 36-37. Where there Is
statutory authorization for rent abatement or rent withholding, the tenant union can be
on much firmer ground. The union can then bargain with the landlord on the basis of
the tenants' right to invoke the statutory procedures. See Note, supra note 106, at 122.23.
154. See Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1894).
155. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 138, at 25.
156. 1 A?ERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.64 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
157. Interview with Tony Henry, tenant union organizer, in Chicago, May 2, 1967.
158. See TENANTS' ]RJGTS 10.
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equity's requirement of irreparable harm as a prerequisite to the is-
suance of an injunction.1 9 With no immediate, irreparable harm in
prospect, the landlord should be remitted to his existing, adequate
legal remedies. Meanwhile, as the lease actions or summary eviction
proceedings drag on, both tenants and landlord come under strong
pressure to reach an agreement. Neither can find the uncertainties and
disadvantages of the strike situation attractive. Self-interest should
move each side to negotiate, compromise, and settle on the basis of a
realistic appraisal of the other party's economic strength.
C. The Collective Bargaining Agreement
The final negotiation of a collective agreement with the landlord
represents the fruition of the tenant union's efforts. The contracts vary
widely in sophistication, specific terms, and the number of buildings
covered. The typical agreement contains the following provisions:
Substantive promises:
" a union commitment to encourage and oversee tenant efforts
in responsible apartment maintenance;
* a landlord commitment to make certain initial repairs and to
meet basic maintenance standards thereafter;
" a maximum rent scale for the life of the contract;
" a union commitment not to strike;
Enforcement provisions:
" machinery for the regular transmission of tenant complaints
and demands to the landlord;
• an arbitration board to resolve disputes over grievances with
power to compel repairs;
" a procedure for rent withholding if the landlord fails to
comply with the agreement;
Landlord-union relations:
" landlord recognition of the union as exclusive bargaining
agent;
" a landlord commitment not to discriminate against union
members;
* a requirement that the landlord inform the tenant union of
the addresses of all buildings owned and managed by him,
and of the names of all new tenants as they move in.2cY
159. See I J. Pounmoy, EQurry JuRisPRUDENcE § 221 (5th ed. 1941). For a discussion of
general factors militating against injunctive relief, see Developments in the Law-In unc-
tions, 78 HiAv. L. REv. 994, 1004-13 (1965).
160. See contracts on file at the Yale Law Journal.
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Increasingly, collective bargaining agreements provide for a dues
checkoff by the landlord.161
Most important to the union is the landlord's acceptance of binding
arbitration and the private enforcement mechanism of the rent with-
holding provision; their combined effect produces considerable eco-
nomic pressure on the landlord to make necessary repairs rather than
delay or take the matter into court. A Chicago tenant union that failed
to include the enforcement provisions in its contract found itself little
better off than if it had no contract at all.1 2 Under present common
law the tenant can sue for damages for breach of a covenant to repair,oa3
but the expense and delay of legal action often deter litigation. A
collective agreement with no private enforcement provisions simply
trades one lawsuit for another. The landlord is under no incentive to
act and may simply await litigation, knowing that it is unlikely to come.
In exchange for his promises the landlord receives a union commit-
ment to encourage responsible tenant maintenance of apartments.
The union's promise is not empty, and in fact landlords have placed
great reliance upon it. The potential for reducing vandalism and turn-
over played a large part in convincing several landlords to sign their
first collective bargaining agreement with a tenant union' 0 4 One land-
lord estimated that he could increase maintenance expenditures by
20 per cent if vandalism and turnover were reduced. 106 It is still too
soon to evaluate the union's effectiveness in promoting tenant respon-
sibility, but after extended dealings with the unions, several landlords
have come to look favorably on the prospect of their continued exis-
tence.166 As the union increases its control over the buildings, the
161. See, e.g., Old Town Gardens contract, copy on file at the Yale Law Journal.
162. Interview with Richard Rothstein, JOIN tenant union organizer, in Chicago,
May 2, 1967.
163. See 1 AMICmAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.79, at 351-52 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). The
collective bargaining contract might be considered an elaborate and cumbersome substitute
for making the tenant's obligation to pay rent dependent on the landlord's fulfilling a
promise to repair., The agreement, however, has two advantages over dependent covenants,
First, the rent money continues to be collected and to be available to make repairs. The
landlord is not only suffering from the loss of rents, but also is encouraged to make
repairs by the money accumulating in escrow. Second, dependent covenants would affect
only individual tenants. Presumably, the doctrine would be grounded on the landlord's
material breach of the individual lease. If the landlord failed to make repairs that affected
only one or two tenants, only those one or two tenants would be entitled to cease paying
rent. As in the case of statutory reforms affecting only individual tenants, the amount of
pressure on the landlord is likely to be insufficient to convince him to make the necessary
repairs.
164. Interview with John Condor, Chicago landlord, in Chicago, July 6, 1966.
165. Speech by Herbert Cohen to Yale Law School seminar, Nov. 16, 1967.
166. See note 8 supra.
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tenants, adopting a more proprietary attitude toward their apartments,
may take better care of them. z7
Courts are likely to approach the collective agreement as warily as
the once-burned child the kitchen stove, but painfully acquired famil-
iarity with the labor agreement should encourage acceptance of the
landlord-tenant arrangement.1'o The judicial eye should experience
little trouble in discerning sufficient consideration to validate the
agreement in the exchange of promises between landlord and tenant.
Consideration has moved to the landlord in the union's promise to
attempt better tenant maintenance. True, tenants are already under
a legal duty to maintain their apartments imposed by most housing
codes and the terms of their leases.'0 9 Still, the union's promise should
not come within the pre-existing legal obligation rule.'7" In the expecta-
tions of the parties tenant vandalism, no matter how illegal, is a fact of
life in the slum housing market. 17' Landlords budget for it, municipal
code enforcement agencies despair over it, and no one can cope with it.
As an empirical matter the landlord attaches value to the commitment
of the union qua organization to encourage tenant responsibility. The
union's promise gives rise to a new obligation along with a cause of
167. Interview with Tony Henry, tenant union organizer, in Chicago, May 2, 1967.
168. Collective agreements have long been confusing phenomena to fit into the laws
tidy pigeonholes. Lenhoff, The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American
Legal System, 39 Mimc. L. REv. 1109 (1941); Witmer, Collective Labor Aqreements in the
Courts, 48 YALE L.J. 195, 196 (1938); Note, The Present Status of Collective Labor Agree-
ments, 51 HAnv. L. REv. 520 (1938). Despite the heavy debt that today's labor agreements
owe to legislative endorsement, pre-NLRA case law and subsequent decisions under the
federal labor laws have greatly enhanced understanding of the nature of collective bar-
gaining, apart from statutory provisions. See Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1958). Corbin has concluded that "[t]he collectivc
bargain is certainly enforceable as a 'contract' against the parties thereto ... by the
ordinary remedies of law and equity in contract cases." GA A. Conrnu, Co~I'TnAcrs § 1420,
at 346 (1962). Most courts have dealt with collective agreements in contract terms, though
some observers have sharply criticized them for doing so. Summers, judicial R ewc of
Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the Looking Glass, 2 BuFFALo L. PLEv. 1, 17-18 (1952).
Most objections to courts viewing collective bargains as contracts were provoked by in-
creasing judicial willingness to venture deeply into the complex administration of a labor
contract-a trend which the Supreme Court curtailed in 1960. United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Vheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Stedworker v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.. 363 U.S.
564 (1960). No contract theory, it is true, wil account for all the complexities of the rela-
tionship governed by collective agreements; in fact, early courts vacillated among at least
three different theories in their attempts to accommodate collective bargains under existingdoctrines. See Note, supra. Nonetheless contract doctrine is useful in analyzing many"
aspects of collective agreements. See Cox, supra, at 5.20. Therefore, courts will probably
evaluate the threshold question of the validity of landlord-tenant agreements according to
traditional contract doctrines.
169. See Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 H-IMy. L. REv. 801, 810-11
(1965); 1 Asrnucaus L~w oF PaoPrarry § 3.39 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
170. For a discussion of the pre-eisting legal obligation rule, see 1A A. ConiN, CO.i-
mA~rS § 171 (1962).
171. Cf. Sax & Hiestand, supra note 26, at 873.
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action that the landlord did not have before the contract. The promise
bears no relation to the situation that the pre-existing legal obligation
rule is designed to meet. The union is not engaging in a hold-up,72
unless every pressure for contractural advantage is defined as such.
Furthermore, the union has committed itself to encourage more than
the minimal maintenance duties the tenant is already obligated to
perform. The union's promises not to withhold rent and to abide by
decisions of the arbitration board also constitute consideration moving
to the landlord. In the labor context the courts have long recognized
that the promise not to strike was good consideration for company
undertakings.173 To the extent that the bargaining agreement also
induces present tenants to remain in the building and new tenants to
move in, the collective contract should further bind the landlord by
virtue of third-party detrimental reliance.1 4
To inspire judicial confidence in the value of its commitments, the
tenant union will do well to develop a formal operating structure of
its own. The first court to grant specific enforcement of a collective
bargaining agreement to a plaintiff union noted that the organization
had backed up its promises by the apparent ability to make good on
them:
Two organizations, one composed of employers and the other of
employees, have entered into an agreement. Each had power
through the consent of its members to enter into a binding obliga.
tion in their behalf. By the constitution or by-laws of each, power
is given to the organization to enforce, through disciplinary pro-
ceedings which have been demonstrated to be effective, compliance
with the terms and conditions to which it has subscribed. This
contract has mutual obligations binding on the parties thereto.
Each party knows the obligation that it has assumed .... Through
its control of its members it can compel performance.175
The courts have traditionally had far less difficulty in detecting the
movement of valuable consideration from employer to labor union,
and it is unlikely that anyone will challenge the validity of the land-
lord's consideration. His promises to repair and to submit to binding
arbitration constitute sufficient consideration in exchange for the under-
takings of the tenant union.
172. See IA A. CoRsiN, CONTRAMCs § 171, at 105-06 (1962).
173. See, e.g., Harper v. Electrical Workers Local 520, 48 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932).
174. See Mabley & Carew Co. v. Borden, 129 Ohio St. 375, 195 N.E. 697 (1935); c.
Lawrence v. Oglesby, 178 Ill. 122, 52 N.E. 945 (1899); Note, 7 U. Cm. L. Rav. 124, 133
(1939).
175. Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 498-99, 194 N.Y.S. 401, 410 (1922).
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A second difficulty in contract analysis arises if the landlord claims
that he signed the agreement under duress. In Sampson v. Davis70 the
landlord pointed to the union-organized rent withholding and pick-
eting. Since every bargaining situation entails some degree of compul-
sion, the landlord asserting duress must demonstrate that he really had
no choice, and that he was compelled to manifest his assent "without
his volition.'1 77 If the tenant union's conduct is lawful, the labor cases
holding that a lawful strike cannot constitute legal duress should con-
trol. s78 If the tenant union's conduct is unlawful, though, the landlord
may still not prevail. Some labor cases have held that under such cir-
cumstances the employer should seek legal relief in the courts.'" More-
over, even if the landlord establishes that he signed under duress, he
still must show that he repudiated the agreement at the earliest oppor-
tunity after removal of the duress. If the landlord accepts any of the
benefits arising from the agreement, remains silent for a considerable
time after he has had the chance to repudiate, or acts on the provisions
of the agreement, he ratifies the contract.'8 0
Tenant unions do not represent a panacea for the country's low-in-
come housing problem. No solution can be advanced without provision
for large-scale infusion of money-either public or private-for rehabili-
tation and new construction. But even the most ambitious government
proposals do not envision the construction of an adequate housing
supply within a decade; realism suggests a considerably longer period
before the country approaches its housing ideal. Interim steps are re-
quired, and the tenant union represents an alternative which may be
beneficial in a variety of situations. There are, of course, circumstances
where tenant unions will be of little use, as, for example, where the
landlord is as destitute as his tenants. But even where unions fail to
attain their housing objectives, they have an equally important poten-
tial for creating better community organization in the slums.
While the tenant unions may be able to emerge intact from judicial
scrutiny, legislation probably represents the best method of structuring
the growth and formation of tenant unions. The real growth of labor
176. 66 CH 4827 (Cook Cty., Ill. Cir. Ct. 1966).
177. RSTATEMENT OF CoNmRAcrs § 492 (1952).
178. E.g., Lewis v. Quality Coal Corp., 270 F.2d 140, 143 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 929 (1960).
179. Cappy's, Inc. v. Dorgan, 313 Mass. 170, 46 N.E.2d 538 (1943).
180. See, e.g., Gallon v. floyd-Thomas Co., 264 F.2d 821 (8th Cir. 1959); AnnoL, 77
A.L.R.2d 426 (1961).
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unions did not take place until the Wagner Act had given labor orga-
nization the stamp of legislative approval. 181 Undoubtedly legislative
endorsement of tenant unions and settlement of housing disputes
through collective bargaining would provide a substantial stimulus to
the organization of tenants. Passage of landlord-tenant relations laws
might go far to minimize the strife and friction so characteristic of
present relations between the low-income tenant and his landlord.
181. Congressional endorsement was, of course, not the only reason for the rapid rie
of labor unions since 1935. See H. FAULKNER & M. STARR, LABOR IN AMERmcA 209"12 (1957).
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